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BLUE VELVET
The 1989 Velvet Revolution and its personal symbol, 
the playwright Vaclav Havel, embodied all that was 
democratic and liberal in the Czech character.
A
mong its former eastern bloc 
neighbours, the Czech lands 
seemed best situated to make a 
successful jump to a society and 
economy close to the western Euro­
pean model.The post-communist 
Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic 
(CSFR) was unique among countries 
in the region in being able tocall upon 
the legacy of a democratic interwar 
republic which survived as a working 
parliamentary democracy until Ger­
man troops snuffed it out in 1938.
On the streets of Prague and 
Bratislava in 1989, the Czechs and 
Slovaks seemed in unanimous con­
sent with the dissidents’ starry vision 
of Czechoslovakia’s future. It was not 
long after those euphoric days, how­
ever, that another side of the Czech 
character also showed itsface. Though 
the average Czech detested the com­
munist system, it was only a tiny mi­
nority of dissident intellectuals who, 
under the dictatorship, had defiantly 
defended the ideals of civil society.
The past three years have pre­
sented a much more diverse picture of 
Czech and Slovak society. The party 
of the former Charter 77 dissidents 
failed even to reach the 5% hurdle 
necessary for parliamentary represen­
tation in last year’s elections. Their 
loss illustrated all too vividly the
schisms between the dissident and the 
average person, the emigre and the 
local, the intellectual and the worker, 
the 1968 Prague Spring generation 
and those who had never hoped for 
anything more than a telephone, a 
flat and a car.
The first signs that all was not well 
surfaced in April and May 1990 when 
a wave of rightwing violence against 
Gypsies and Vietnamese workers cap­
tured headlines in northern Boherpia. 
In northern industrial cities, racist 
Czech skinheads and a confused hy­
brid of Nazi-Punks set upon unarmed 
Gypsies with chains and iron bars. 
Simultaneously, skinheads vigorously 
intensified their campaign against 
Czechoslovakia’s foreign workers, the 
majority of whom are Vietnamese. 
On 1 May 1990,200 skinheads raised 
havoc in central Prague, turning on a 
Canadian tourist group after beating 
up the Gypsies and Vietnamese on 
the main square.
Havel responded immediately to 
the violence, echoing widespread ru­
mours at the time that disillusioned 
elements of the old apparatus, par­
ticularly the security forces, stood be­
hind it. Racial tensions and ethnic 
animosity, however, existed in the 
Czech lands long before the dictator­
ship’s frontmen lost their jobs. It was
while Havel pondered the human 
condition from behind bars in the 
mid-1980s that an underground world 
of neonazi and skinhead hate culture 
found an audience in Prague. By 1987 
or 1988 any tourist could see skinheads 
at cafe in the Prague Old Town. At 
beerhalls they openly fraternised with 
German and Austrian skinheads. Un­
derground heavy metal bands, such as 
the notorious group Orlik, stirred ha­
tred against punks, Gypsies, foreign 
workers, Third World students, 
Slovaks and tourists.
In the revolution’s aftermath, le­
gal Orlik concerts drew as many as 600 
skinheads. Their stage sets displayed 
full-size colour posters of Miroslav 
Sladek, the leaderof the newly-formed 
ultra-rightwing Republican Party. By
1992, experts estimated that there 
were about 1,000 active skins in 
Prague, 500 in Pilzen and roughly
2,000 more scattered throughout 
northern Bohemia. On 24 November
1991, as many as 1,000 assorted 
rightwing hooligans marched through 
Prague’s Wenceslas Square to cries of 
“Gypsies O ut!’’, “Czech for the 
Czechs” and “Gypsies to the gas cham­
bers!”. Police intervened only to stop 
scuffles between the rightwingers and 
a 400-strong counter-demonstration 
of Gypsies and anarchists.
The march wove its way in and 
out of several Gypsy neighbourhoods 
until police disbanded it four hours 
later. “If this crowd had been any 
larger,” said Prague’s Deputy Chief of 
Police at the time, "we would have 
needed water cannons and tear gas.” 
But since December 1989, he noted, 
such means were no longer at his 
disposal.
The fact that Czechoslovakia’s 
guest workers were among the first 
targets of skinhead terror came as lit­
tle surprise to the victims themselves. 
In the late 1970s the Vietnamese gov­
ernment offered the services of its 
workers to the short-handed Czech 
economy to help pay off debts it had 
accrued during the war years. From 
the moment that they landed at the 
Prague airport, the Vietnamese work­
ers had no illusions as to theirpurpose; 
they were the form of value in a primi­
tive process of barter. The guest work­
ers received only the barest language
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training and a thin introduction to 
Czech society. Theirfamilies and chil­
dren were forbidden to join them. 
The state put the Vietnamese to work 
at the most menial of jobs and 
promptly forgot about them.
According to Uyen Phem Huu, a 
30-year-old Vietnamese computer 
engineerwhohas lived in Prague since 
1980, discrimination under commu­
nist rule took more subtle forms than 
it does today. “At that time, people 
couldn’t afford to hit someone in the 
streets. Often you just wouldn’t be 
served in a restaurant or something 
like that. But that was one thing. Now 
there’s democracy and that means 
they can hit whoever they want and 
get away with it.”
A problem more deeply embed­
ded in Czech culture, however, is that 
of the Gypsies. As in other central 
and eastern European countries, the
500,000 to 600,000 Gypsies in the 
Czech lands and Slovakia are the poor­
est, least educated and most discrimi­
nated against part of the population. 
In one opinion poll, 91% of Czechs 
and Slovaks expressed negative feel­
ings toward Gypsies. Since Nazi meas­
ures during the war claimed the lives 
of almost all of the Bohemian and 
Moravian Gypsies, most of those in 
the Czech lands today are Slovak 
Gypsies, sent there after the postwar 
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.
Communist policies, though mak­
ing dents in chronic problems such as 
substandard housing and illiteracy, 
perpetuated and institutionalised the 
racial prejudices that flourished prior 
to World War Two. The regime 
treated the minority as a genetically 
inferior, second class people, with a 
worthless culture. It tried to extermi­
nate the unique Gypsy identity by 
forcibly sterilising women, suppress­
ing Gypsy language and traditions, 
liquidating rural settlements and out­
lawing nomadic wandering.
Unlike its eastern European rela­
tions, Czech “beer hall nationalism" 
centres not around issues of territorial 
expansion, religious identification, 
national independence or ethnic kin 
outside its borders. More along the 
lines of western Europe’s new Right 
culture, it plays primarily upon the 
racial prejudices and economic anxi­
eties of the lower and middle classes.
As economic cond it ions worsened 
and criminality sky-rocketed, the Gyp­
sies in the polluted, industrial waste­
lands of northern Bohemia found 
themselves the most convenient 
scapegoats for popular frustration. 
Journalists from northern Bohemian 
cities tell of “running race wars” be­
tween Czechs and Gypsies.
By mid-1991 that hostility had 
come back to its source— the average 
burgher. According to Charles Uni­
versity sociologist VaclavTrojan, “the 
first violence was a barometer of deeper 
social tensions within society”. The 
former dissident argues that these feel­
ings “had been building up for years, 
and then finally got the signal to ex­
plode”. Police forces have come un­
der heavy pressure to crack down on 
Gypsies, or at least to allow the 
skinheads to do the dirty work for 
them. “Local communities have 
shown clear popular support for the 
pogroms, for the skins and for the 
police,” says Trojan.
The political manifestation of that 
hatred is the Republican Party which 
soared from obscurity onto the 
Czechoslovak political stage last sum­
mer. Their spectacular election gain 
was one of the most painful of the 
many kicks that Czech democrats took 
in 1992. The Republicans marched 
into the legislature with over 5% of 
the total Czech vote.
Until thejune 1992 elections, the 
crude Czech nationalism of the Re­
publican Party had found an ear only 
on the streets. From early on, party 
president Sladek aimed his demagogic 
message at the disillusioned and dis­
placed in Czech society. In those first 
blissful days of new freedom and 
dreams of free market prosperity, 
Sladek’s angry appeal found resonance 
almost exclusively among skinheads 
and their sympathisers.
The clean-cut 3 5 year-old bureau - 
crat-tumed-politician openly courted 
the young militants, posing the Re­
publicans as the party for social secu­
rity and law and order. His pre-De- 
cember 1989 post as a small-time cen­
sor in the official Central Bureau for 
Press and Information didn’t faze the 
young thugs. More important to them 
was the Republicans’ early demand to
expel all Vietnamese and Cuban guest 
workers from Czechoslovakia.
As the revolution began to lose its 
glitter, Sladek tirelessly traversed the 
country, painting an opaque picture 
of society in which conspiracy and 
impenetrable networks stacked the 
deck against ordinary citizens. While 
Civic Forum’s leadership made policy 
from on high in Prague Castle, he 
peddled his message to the people. At 
aggressive, highly charged demonstra­
tions, he railed against the “commu­
nist agents” in Civic Forum, against 
the secret police “staged” revolution 
and against “Gypsy criminality”. 
Among the Republicans’ foremost 
demands is a full purge and ban on all 
former members of the communist 
party from official positions.
As Sladek’s star seemed to be ris­
ing in 1990, he tried to distance him­
self from hisjack-booted shocktroops. 
But the issues with which he had first 
won the skins’ hearts remained cen­
tral to the Republicans’ agenda. In its 
program, the party vaguely mentions 
its intention “to solve the problem of 
the Gypsies by resettling them”. In 
standard central European phraseol­
ogy, “resettling” tends to be a diplo­
matic term for expulsion, in this case 
sending the Slovak Gypsy populations 
in Bohemia and Moravia back to 
Slovakia.
According to Klara Samkova of 
the Gypsy Civic Initiative (GCI), a 
Prague-based political party, the Re­
publicans’ proposals “v iolate j ust about 
every international statute on human 
rights that exists”. That fact, how­
ever, doesn’t bother the Republicans. 
To the contrary, “Sladek is in parlia­
ment today because of his hateful 
rhetoric against Gypsies,” says 
Samkova.
The Republicans, not surprisingly, 
scored their biggest victories in north­
ern Bohemia—also the site of even 
stronger showings from the reform 
communist party. The ultra-right and 
the Left Bloc took big constituencies 
from the democratic parties by argu­
ing against full-speed ahead privatisa­
tion and the dismantling of social 
services. Sladek’s populism found an 
audience in the lower and middle 
classes, disproportionately among 
working class men in their 20s.
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The simple presence of the Re­
publicans in the Czech legislature con­
tributes to the drastically overhauled 
face of Czech politics in the aftermath 
of the 1992 elections. Along with the 
formerCharter 77 dissidents, any talk 
of civil society and expanded forms of 
democracy has vanished from politi­
cal discourse. The monetarists of 
Vaclav Klaus’Civic Democratic Party 
(CDP) dominate parliament. Follow­
ing the recent dissolution of Czecho­
slovakia human rights activists in the 
Czech Republic fear that the govern­
ment’s conservative tint will aggra­
vate tensions between minorities and 
the majority. “Our two years of grace 
are over,” says Gypsy spokesperson 
Samkova, who slipped into parlia­
ment as a GCI deputy in 1990 under 
the Civic Forum umbrella.
Samkova’s efforts to put her or­
ganisation under the Klaus party’s 
wing during the 1992 election cam­
paign were rebutted. "They said that 
they were sorry but that they simply 
didn’t want to risk the white vote,” 
she explains. “The CDP doesn’t see 
how human rights and minority issues 
are useful to it. If something doesn’t 
bring them immediate economic 
profit, it’s expendable.” ■
PAUL HOCKENOS’ book Free to 
Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post- 
Communist Central Europe will ap­
pear in 1993.
THE JOYS OF SPRING
The End of History, 
It seems, may not be 
upon us after all—  
and with David Owen 
as its handmaiden, 
who can really be 
surprised? But it 
always rested on a 
dubious premise, at 
least as far as one 
allegedly liberal 
democratic western 
European country is 
concerned: namely, 
that history was 
moving in the first 
place.
In Ireland, history has a habit of getting stuck—and usually in the most uncomfortable places, like 
the 17th century. One German mem­
ber of the European Parliament recog­
nised that fact during last year’s crisis 
over the right of a 14 year-old alleged 
rape victim to travel to Britain for an 
abortion. “I propose,” he said, “that 
only states which have experienced 
the Age of Enlightenment can be 
members [of the EC].”
But if such dangerously new­
fangled concepts such as the separa­
tion of church and state have still to 
be fully accepted in the Republic, the 
political party system has at least ad­
vanced unequivocally into the 20th 
century—all the way to 1923, to be 
exact. That was the year in which the 
brief but savage civil war ended. The 
war was fought over the treaty signed 
with Britain in 1921, which granted 
the 26 counties which now constitute 
the Republic of Ireland de facto inde­
pendence, but left the six north-east­
ern counties with large protestant 
populations under British rule. The 
pro-treaty forces defeated the hardline 
republicans who refused to accept 
partition. Yet the cleavage between 
the two was to remain the essential 
dividing line in Irish politics for the 
next 70 years, as the opposing civil 
war factions evolved into constitu­
tional political parties, Fianna Fail 
(anti-treaty) and Fine Gael (pro- 
treaty).
It remained so until last Novem­
ber’s elections, when the Labour Party
achieved what seems to be a historic 
breakthrough, more than doubling its 
representation to 33 seats in the 165- 
seat parliament. This achievement, 
modest enough as it appears on paper, 
has been greeted as a watershed in 
Irish political history, the ‘end of civil 
war politics’. The two main parties 
between them secured only 63% of 
the primary vote, Fianna Fail register­
ing their worst performance since 
1927, Fine Gael theirworst since 1948.
After two months of horse trad ing, 
Labour rather surprisingly decided to 
enter a coalition with Fianna Fail, 
securing six cabinet positions, and 
the posts of deputy prime minister 
and foreign minister for their popular 
leader, Dick Spring. The long-term 
significance of the result lies less in 
the particular nature of the govern­
ment formed in its aftermath than in 
the vastly increased influence wielded 
by Labour, the prospect of further 
erosion of the two main parties’ votes 
in the future, and the development of 
a more conventional political system 
characterised by Left-Right distinc­
tions rather than atavistic mysticism.
Ironically, it is the party repre­
senting the losers in the civil war, 
Fianna Fail (‘Warriors of Destiny’), 
which has dominated Irish political 
history ever since they swallowed their 
pride and entered parliament in 1927. 
Fianna Fail have governed alone or 
(briefly) in coalition for no less than 
44 years since then. Since 1932, Fine 
Gael (‘The Tribe of the Gaels’) has 
always been the second largest party.
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